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DO WE CARE ENOUGH ABOUT RACIAL INEQUALITY? 
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GUY-URIEL E. CHARLES† 
In response to Kimberly West-Faulcon, The River Runs Dry:  When Title 
VI Trumps State Anti–Affirmative Action Laws, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1075 
(2009). 
 
It is remarkable that in the United States, with our legacy of legal 
slavery, the problem of racial discrimination that most troubles judges, 
policymakers, and political elites is the affirmative use of race by the 
state to promote equality for citizens of color.  The Supreme Court of 
the United States has prohibited the City of Louisville, famous for its 
separate-but-unequal schools, from considering race in its efforts to 
prevent the voluntary segregation of its public schools.1  In Chief Jus-
tice Roberts’s world, to hold otherwise would violate the principal 
meaning of Brown v. Board of Education.2  Opponents of affirmative ac-
tion have succeeded in eliminating the use of race by state officials in 
California, Washington, Michigan, and Nebraska.3 
Proponents of affirmative action, once beneficiaries of nondiscri-
mination doctrine, are now on the defensive.  They are losing in the 
courts and in the political process.  The Court seems determined to 
 
† Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. 
1 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 
2768 (2007) (holding that the school district “ha[d] not carried the heavy burden of 
demonstrating that [the Court] should allow” the use of racial classifications to deter-
mine public school admissions). 
2 Id. at 2767 (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)). 
3 See Kimberly West-Faulcon, The River Runs Dry:  When Title VI Trumps State Anti–
Affirmative Action Laws, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1075, 1078 (2009) (discussing California’s 
Proposition 209, Washington’s Initiative 200, Michigan’s Proposal 2, and Nebraska’s 
Initiative 424—all state anti–affirmative action initiatives). 
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eliminate the use of race as a criterion for decisionmaking by state ac-
tors, notwithstanding the devastating impact that such action might 
have on citizens of color.4  With respect to the political process, judg-
ing by the relative success of state anti–affirmative action initiatives, 
that arena does not appear any more promising.  Proponents of racial 
equality—those who care about reducing the often gaping and shock-
ing disparities between blacks and Latinos on one side and whites on the 
other—are in need of fresh thinking and a new theoretical framework. 
Stepping into the breach, Professor Kimberly West-Faulcon offers 
just that in her article The River Runs Dry:  When Title VI Trumps State 
Anti–Affirmative Action Laws.  The article takes racial inequality serious-
ly and sees its amelioration as possible within the context of extant le-
gal and jurisprudential frameworks.  She focuses her analysis on pub-
lic universities in states that have eliminated the use of race through 
initiatives and referenda.  She shows empirically that admissions poli-
cies at public universities in California and Washington have had a sta-
tistically significant and disproportionately negative impact on the 
admissions prospects of black and Latino applicants.  For example, in 
2004, the University of California, Berkeley accepted 28.5% of white 
applicants for undergraduate admission; by contrast, only 15.4% of black 
applicants were granted admission.5 
Professor West-Faulcon argues that large disparities in admissions 
between black and white applicants (and between Latino and white 
applicants) could violate Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
which, inter alia, prohibits entities receiving public funds from adopt-
ing admissions policies that have the effect of discriminating on the 
basis of race.6  If Title VI were understood properly and given effect, 
she argues, it would prohibit the racial disparities in admissions that 
we have seen as a result of the elimination of affirmative action in 
many states.7  Universities would be forced to justify their reliance on 
standardized tests—the proximate cause of the racial disparities in 
admissions—or would be required to take race into account in order 
to comply with federal law, notwithstanding the state prohibition.8 
In this brief Response, I explore a reasonable assumption that un-
derlies Professor West-Faulcon’s article, namely, that the failure to 
 
4 See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2768 (“The way to stop discrimination on the 
basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”). 
5 See West-Faulcon, supra note 3, at 1133 tbl.1. 
6 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006). 
7 See West-Faulcon, supra note 3, at 1082. 
8 Id. at 1082-84. 
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take seriously the problems of inequality that afflict communities of 
color—e.g., racial inequality in education—is a consequence of the 
absence of (or the failure to recognize) legal tools sufficient to the 
task.  The assumption implies that we need more legal tools; if more 
legal tools were available, then we could begin to stem the tide of ra-
cial inequality.  As Professor West-Faulcon shows in her article, howev-
er, legal tools are available.  What, then, accounts for the failure of 
courts, specifically the Supreme Court, to take seriously the problem 
of racial inequality?  I suggest that courts do not care enough about 
racial inequality and the dignity of people of color. 
As Professor West-Faulcon shows in The River Runs Dry, legal tools 
are available to address the problem of inequality.  In the specific con-
text of higher education and university admissions, university officials 
have a duty under Title VI to ensure that admissions policies do not 
have such an unjustified adverse impact on applicants of color as to 
constitute Title VI effect discrimination.9  Thus, while universities may 
rely upon standardized tests, such as the SAT, as a basis for making 
admissions decisions, they violate Title VI where reliance on those 
tests has a disproportionate negative impact on applicants of color 
and they cannot show that their reliance is an “educational necessity.”10 
University officials in states that have passed anti–affirmative ac-
tion measures are subject to two different legal duties.  State statutes 
and constitutions forbid states from taking race into account in admis-
sions.11  Under Title VI, however, they may not employ admissions pol-
icies that have a disproportionate negative impact on applicants of 
color unless the policies are an educational necessity.  Where these 
two duties clash, university officials must reject the state mandate in 
favor of the federal mandate.12 
The question, then, is why university officials have opted to follow 
state law and eliminate the use of race as a criterion in admissions in-
stead of relying upon the broader vision of racial equality offered by 
Title VI.  This is a particularly puzzling question if university officials 
 
9 Id. at 1124-28 (discussing the Supreme Court’s decision in Griggs v. Duke Power 
Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), which recognized that discriminatory effect can be a form of 
racial discrimination). 
10 Id. at 1125-26. 
11 E.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 26; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 30; 
WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.400 (2008). 
12 See West-Faulcon, supra note 3, at 1092 (“According to the federal-funding ex-
ception, anti–affirmative action laws ‘do[] not prohibit action that must be taken to 
establish or maintain eligibility for any federal program, if ineligibility would result in a 
loss of federal funds to the state.’” (alteration in original) (quoting MICH. CONST. art. 
I, § 26(4); WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.400(6))). 
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comply reluctantly with state policies that demand the elimination of 
race as a consideration in admissions.  If university officials were reluc-
tant to comply with the state mandate—and if there were a contrary, 
and arguably controlling, mandate—one would expect university offi-
cials to rely upon the contrary mandate, if there were a legitimate le-
gal basis for doing so. 
One possibility is that Title VI is not the strong vehicle that Profes-
sor West-Faulcon argues it is.  After all, the Supreme Court has held 
that the disparate impact regulations of Title VI do not provide a pri-
vate cause of action.13  Consequently, applicants of color who are cate-
gorically disfavored by a university’s admissions policy cannot bring 
suit under Title VI to vindicate their rights. 
If there were a private cause of action for disparate impact dis-
crimination under Title VI, state officials would presumably be forced 
to consider the effect of discriminatory admissions policies.  Without a 
private cause of action, however, anti–affirmative action advocates are 
the only potential plaintiffs that state officials are incentivized to con-
sider in their litigation-risk calculus. 
In the absence of a private right to sue, applicants of color must 
rely upon enforcement actions by the Department of Justice to vindi-
cate their rights.  Such enforcement actions were nonstarters in the 
Bush Administration, given that the administration was ideologically 
aligned with opponents of affirmative action.  That explanation, how-
ever, is obviously not available to explain why the Clinton and Obama 
Administrations have not forced public universities in anti–affirmative 
action states to justify the wide gap between admission rates of white 
applicants and applicants of color. 
More substantively, Title VI may be a less-than-compelling legal 
vehicle for enforcing racial equality in university admissions.  An im-
portant question for the Title VI analysis in this context is whether 
university officials are justified in their reliance on standardized tests, 
the primary cause of the disparate impact documented in The River 
Runs Dry.  Under Title VI, the inquiry is whether reliance on standar-
dized tests as part of the admissions process is justifiable as a business 
or educational necessity.14  Put differently, in the context of university 
admissions, the question is whether universities can justify using the 
 
13 Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286-93 (2001) (finding nothing in the text 
of Title VI or its legislative history supporting a private right of action). 
14 See West-Faulcon, supra note 3, at 1129 n.192 (noting that a showing of educa-
tional necessity can rebut a finding that an admissions practice has a discriminatory 
effect (citing Larry P. ex rel. Lucille P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969, 981 n.6 (9th Cir. 1984))).   
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SAT as an admissions criterion, notwithstanding the resulting dispro-
portionate racial impact, on the ground that its use is necessary to fur-
ther the purpose of the university. 
Much ink has been spilled casting doubt on the presumed linear 
relationship between exceptional performance (or poor perfor-
mance) on standardized tests and educational achievement.15  As valu-
able as I find that literature, however, I am skeptical that courts will 
conclude that standardized tests are an unnecessary educational tool—
i.e., unrelated to and not necessary for the purpose of the university—
and therefore violate Title VI.16  Courts are more likely to believe that 
university officials have a legitimate, good-faith basis for relying on 
standardized tests, either as a necessary sorting mechanism (to help them 
sort through a large number of applicants for few spots) or as a predictive 
device (to enable them to assess who will do well at their school). 
Even if university officials were to assert the least justifiable reason 
for the use of standardized tests—i.e., to enhance the prestige of insti-
tutions of higher learning—courts would likely defer to the judgment 
of the officials that there is a relationship between prestige and educa-
tional quality.  For example, university officials can plausibly argue 
that, all else equal, alumni are more likely to donate to a school if they 
feel that the school is on an upward trajectory.  Similarly, students are 
more likely to matriculate at a school that they view as prestigious, all 
else equal.  Evidence to support such arguments is not difficult to 
amass—or believe.  Thus, while courts are likely to conclude that stan-
dardized tests are imperfect tools, I doubt that they will find them so 
flawed as to demand that university officials choose between using stan-
dardized tests—to the extent that they preserve or enhance the elite sta-
tus of their institution (or facilitate its sorting function, or further some 
other legitimate purpose)—and dispensing with them in favor of elimi-
nating the racial disparate impact in admissions caused by their use. 
If courts are sympathetic to the problem of racial inequality in 
admissions, they are more likely to permit university officials to take 
race into account to make up for the adverse racial impact of using 
standardized tests in admissions decisions.  But this invites a question:  
do courts care about racial inequality?  To the extent that the Su-
preme Court determines what courts ought to care about or 
 
15 See id. at 1103-05 (reviewing much of the literature).  
16 In Ricci v. DeStefano, the Supreme Court concluded that, notwithstanding signif-
icant disparate impact, the promotional tests at issue were job related.  See 129 S. Ct. 
2658, 2678 (2009) (finding that the examinations at issue were “consistent with busi-
ness necessity”). 
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represents what they do care about, eliminating racial inequality is not 
at the top of the list. 
Consider in this context Chief Justice Roberts’s inane statement in 
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 that 
“[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discri-
minating on the basis of race.”17  To what extent does the Chief Jus-
tice’s analysis in Parents Involved evince any concern for the vast major-
ity of black and brown children consigned to substandard schools in 
Louisville and Seattle?  Instead of seriously engaging with the problem 
of racial inequality, the Chief Justice offers empty platitudes.  If Parents 
Involved is considered the relevant controlling precedent, race con-
sciousness in admissions per Title VI would simply be viewed, in the 
parlance of Parents Involved, as impermissible racial balancing that vi-
olates the Fourteenth Amendment.  Using race to counteract the ef-
fect of the state’s use of standardized tests would surely not be viewed 
as a compelling state interest.18 
More promising is Justice Kennedy’s approach in Ricci v. DeStefano, 
a case that explicitly disapproved of the use of race to avoid discrimi-
natory impact liability under Title VII.19  The question in Ricci was 
whether state officials could disregard the results of a promotion test 
because a sufficient number of test takers of color did not score well 
enough to be eligible for promotion.20  Though the Court concluded 
that state officials could not ignore the results without violating Title 
VII’s equal treatment requirement, Justice Kennedy tried to accom-
modate both the white employees’ legitimate expectations of equal-
treatment and the expectations of employees of color that entrance 
and promotion examinations will not be used to preclude them from 
entering their chosen profession or advancing within it.  He reasoned 
that employers can take race into account to avoid the disparate im-
pact of promotion examinations if the employer has a strong basis in 
evidence to believe that her failure to do so would violate Title VII.21 
Though Justice Kennedy’s approach in Ricci improves upon the 
Chief Justice’s attempt in Parents Involved, it does not arrive at Profes-
 
17 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2768 (2007). 
18 If the state were to argue that it is required to take race into account under Title 
VI, the Court would simply retort that Title VI does not compel the state to use stan-
dardized tests in admissions. 
19 129 S. Ct. at 2681 (“Fear of [Title VII disparate impact] litigation alone cannot 
justify an employer’s reliance on race . . . .”). 
20 Id. at 2664-65. 
21 Id. at 2677. 
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sor West-Faulcon’s preferred conclusion.  Importantly, Justice Kenne-
dy is explicit that Ricci does not stand for the proposition that meeting 
the strong-basis-in-evidence standard would satisfy the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.22  Thus, statutory analysis under Title VI or Title VII in the 
context of university admissions does not avoid the problem of the un-
friendly and sometimes hostile constitutional framework that the 
Court has developed in the context of race. 
Further, Justice Kennedy is also clear that significant disparate ra-
cial impact alone is not equivalent to a strong basis in evidence justify-
ing race consciousness.23  On one of the promotion examinations at 
issue in Ricci, the score disparity between white test takers and test 
takers of color was nearly twenty-seven percent.24  Though Justice 
Kennedy described the gap as “significant,” he nevertheless concluded 
that the strong-basis-in-evidence standard was not met because the 
promotion tests were job related and because there was no reason to 
believe that equally valid but less discriminatory alternatives were 
available.25  Thus, even under Ricci, which, as a theoretical matter, en-
tertains the notion that state actors can take race into account (at least 
under Title VII) to minimize the racial impact of a standardized test, 
the concession is stingy at best.  The Court was unimpressed by the 
wide racial gap; it found the use of a standardized test used to deter-
mine promotions for firefighters consistent with business necessity, 
and it went to great pains to note that options contemplated by its sta-
tutory analysis might be prohibited by its constitutional analysis.   
In The River Runs Dry, Professor West-Faulcon proves that legal 
tools are available for addressing the problem of racial inequality.  But 
the article also shows that the problem is not singularly legal.  At its 
root, I believe, the problem of racial inequality is the failure of the le-
gal system to recognize the dignity of people of color in constitutional 
analysis.  To put it more accurately, the dignity of people of color does 
not carry the same weight as the dignity of white people.26  This is a 
political choice by the Supreme Court.  As an initial pass, the Court is 
self-consciously making a choice, on the basis of variables other than 
 
22 Id. at 2676. 
23 Id. at 2678. 
24 Id. at 2677-78. 
25 Id. at 2678. 
26 I am influenced and persuaded here by the account of dignity provided by Je-
remy Waldron.  See generally Jeremy Waldron, Dignity, Rank, and Rights:  The 2009 Tan-
ner Lectures at UC Berkeley (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research 
Paper Series, Working Paper No. 09-50, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1461220 (discussing the important role of “human dignity” in the formation 
of the law). 
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“law,” between the rights of innocent white victims and (also innocent 
but rarely viewed as such) supplicants of color.  Whether under Title 
VI, Title VII, or the Equal Protection Clause, it is a choice in which law 
is not outcome determinative. 
The problem is not that the choice is political.  Chief Justice Ro-
berts’s opinion in Parents Involved is as political as Justice Kennedy’s opi-
nion in Ricci and Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Grutter v. Bollinger.27  
The problem is that the Court’s political analysis—the determination 
of who or what counts in the analysis of constitutional equality—does 
not reflect (or no longer reflects) much, if any, empathy or sympathy 
for the plight of people of color.  The Court’s political analysis fails to 
take (or is incapable of taking) seriously claims by people of color about 
what counts or ought to count as a violation of constitutional equality. 
Consider, in this vein, Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Ricci.  
Justice Scalia writes, 
I join the Court’s opinion in full, but write separately to observe that its 
resolution of this dispute merely postpones the evil day on which the 
Court will have to confront the question:  Whether, or to what extent, 
are the disparate-impact provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 consistent with the Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection?
28
 
If this is true, legal academics need to meet the challenge in the do-
main in which it is presented.  Justice Scalia closes his opinion with an 
admonition:  “The Court’s resolution of these cases makes it unneces-
sary to resolve these matters today.  But the war between disparate im-
pact and equal protection will be waged sooner or later, and it be-
hooves us to begin thinking about how—and on what terms—to make 
peace between them.”29  If people of color are to have a chance at 
winning this war, legal academics ought to make a renewed case why 
we ought to care about racial inequality.  To do so, as The River Runs 
Dry intimates, legal academics ought to prepare themselves to fight on 
two fronts:  law and politics. 
  
 
27 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
28 129 S. Ct. at 2681-82 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
29 Id. at 2683. 
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